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ABSTRACT 
The 2020 World Migration Report by the International Organization for 
Migration recognized that Colombia has accepted more Venezuelan migrants than any 
other nation in Latin America. Additionally, a December 2019 article by The Brookings 
Institution identified Venezuela’s migratory crisis as the second largest in the 
world, trailing only the Syrian refugee crisis. The sheer size of Venezuela’s migration 
crisis is affecting all neighboring countries on economic, political, and 
humanitarian fronts. Despite Colombia’s delicate socioeconomic landscape and 
struggle to care for its own citizens, it has welcomed Venezuelans, in particular, with 
open arms. However, in other countries that neighbor Venezuela, like Peru and 
Ecuador, the response to this immigration has varied significantly. Some countries 
have all but closed their borders, showing signs of fear and xenophobia. This research 
found that stronger historical ties between two nations enable a more welcoming 
reception of the sending country’s migrants. When two nations have not interacted 
much, however, the solidarity toward immigrants fades faster. Ultimately, 
understanding the influential factors can help shape policy, debunk misconceptions 
about immigrants, and better equip governments to handle large influxes of people. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Though it was a flourishing country in the 1980s and 1990s, a humanitarian crisis 
is now going on in Venezuela that is affecting the rest of Latin America. In the last twenty 
years, the nation has shed large portions of its population. In 1999, many students and 
middle-class citizens left amid fears about the election of socialist Hugo Chavez. In 2012, 
more middle- and lower-income citizens departed, following a drop in growth of Latin 
American commodities. The largest exodus, however, started in 2015, when Venezuela 
economically collapsed under its new leader, Nicolas Maduro.1 This last wave has resulted 
in a humanitarian catastrophe, trailing only the Syrian refugee crisis in its impact; over five 
million Venezuelans have fled in the last five years alone, with most settling in Colombia, 
Peru, and Ecuador and others fleeing to Chile, Argentina, and Brazil. Unfortunately, the 
exodus is not slowing; millions of remaining Venezuelans have also expressed their desire 
to leave the country.2  
As they have settled throughout Latin America, however, the reception of 
Venezuelan migrants has widely differed depending on the receiving country. A recent 
study by Javier Corrales, a political science professor, captured six Latin American 
countries’ attitudes toward receiving immigrants.3 Through its scoring system—which 
measured countries’ “welcomeness” toward Venezuelan immigrants and refugees by 
assessing their legal facilities, survival services, popular response, and military response to 
                                                 
1 Luisa Feline Freier and Nicolas Parent, “The Regional Response to the Venezuelan Exodus,” 
Current History, Latin America, 118, no. 805 (February 2019): 56. 
2 Cynthia J. Arnson, “The Venezuelan Refugee Crisis Is Not Just a Regional Problem,” Foreign 
Affairs, July 30, 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/venezuela/2019-07-26/venezuelan-refugee-
crisis-not-just-regional-problem; “Millions of Venezuelans Say They Would Leave if They Could,” Gallup, 
January 29, 2019, https://news.gallup.com/poll/246323/millions-venezuelans-say-leave.aspx. 
3 Javier Corrales, “Responses to the Venezuelan Migration Crisis: A Scorecard,” Americas Quarterly, 
July 9, 2019, https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/responses-venezuelan-migration-crisis-scorecard. 
2 
immigration4—the study found that Colombia had provided the most welcoming 
environment. To date, Colombia has opened its borders to 1.5 million Venezuelan 
migrants, which is more than any other nation in Latin America and the rest of the world. 
Moreover, the Colombian government implemented an exception to its citizenship policy 
that led to the naturalization of 24,000 children born of Venezuelan parents.5 Colombia’s 
warm reception is not limited to political support; its border-town citizens also share their 
homes with migrant families at no cost, even when accommodations are tight.6  
While the initial reception to immigrants in nations like Peru and Ecuador was 
similarly positive, over time over time these countries have become tepid and even 
antipathetic, fearful, xenophobic, and restrictive toward migrants.7 Peru and Ecuador have 
accepted 800,000 and 360,000 immigrants, respectively, but their bonhomie expired 
approximately four years into the crisis. In 2019, for instance, Ecuador enacted passport 
and visa guidelines for Venezuelans that made it practically impossible for them to enter 
legally.8 Following suit, Peru also established strict entry requirements, which almost 
immediately resulted in a 91 percent decrease in immigration, leading to a surge of refugee 
                                                 
4 If the first three factors were conducive to benefitting the immigrants, the score was higher, while 
decreased military presence was more positively rated. Additionally, countries were given an increased 
score if their national burden was greater. This score corresponded to both the percentage of accepted 
Venezuelan immigrants with relation to the receiving nation’s population and the percentage of accepted 
immigrants compared to the total number of Venezuelan migrants. Thus, researchers demonstrably 
presented variation in welcomeness and highlighted evidential differences in how six neighboring nations 
have responded to the influx of Venezuelan immigrants.  
5 Anatoly Kurmanaev and Jenny Carolina González, “Colombia Offers Citizenship to 24,000 Children 
of Venezuelan Refugees,” New York Times, August 5, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/05/world/
americas/colombia-citizenship-venezuelans.html. 
6 Vox, “Why Colombia Has Taken in 1 Million Venezuelans,” November 27, 2018, YouTube, video, 
8:29, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NU0RqwweuWY. 
7 Megan Janetsky, “Fears Stoke Backlash against Venezuelans in Peru,” BBC, August 1, 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-49156814. 
8 “Ecuador Visa Rules for Venezuela Refugees Violates Human Rights Obligations,” WOLA, August 
27, 2019, https://www.wola.org/2019/08/ecuador-visa-venezuela-migrants-refugees-human-rights-
obligations/; “Venezuelan Migrants Flood into Ecuador Ahead of New Visa Restrictions,” Reuters, August 
27, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-colombia-idUSKCN1VG1SX. 
3 
camps at the Peru–Ecuador border.9 This political sentiment has also been expressed at the 
social level: in August of 2019, 73 percent of Peruvians stated they opposed Venezuelan 
immigration, with more than half believing that the migrants were engaged in crimes—a 
misconception refuted by official statistics.10  
What explains this significant variation in attitudes toward mass migrants and 
refugees? Why do some countries welcome them compassionately while others reject 
them? In the Venezuelan case, why has Colombia—that has often struggled to care for its 
own citizens and has taken in the greatest number of migrants—continued to embrace 
Venezuelans with open arms while Peru has backtracked on its initially welcoming 
reception? 
The purpose of this research is to identify the factors that shape the variation in 
attitudes toward immigration that, in turn, may affect the duration of migrant acceptance 
within a receiving country. To address this puzzle, this thesis examines the two largest and 
most contrasting recipients of Venezuelan migrants: Colombia and Peru. It argues that 
although individual categorical theories partially explain the attitude variation, a historical 
examination of relevant interactions between two nations is required to fully explain the 
outcome. Specifically, this thesis argues that differences in historical social interactions 
between these countries have produced different patterns of social ties. Where the ties have 
been strong, a greater sense of reciprocity has increased citizens’ solidarity toward 
Venezuelan refugees. In contrast, where ties have been weaker, reciprocity has been limited 
and welcoming attitudes have easily eroded.  
Uncovering the factors that determine a country’s receptiveness toward immigrants 
and refugees is important for several reasons. Violence, famine, state collapses and wars, 
have caused prominent mass migrations around the world, including the Syrian 
humanitarian crisis and the case of Africans fleeing to Europe. There has also been a rise 
                                                 
9 Dánae Rivadeneyra, “Así es como Perú cerró sus puertas a los migrantes venezolanos [This is how 
Peru closed its doors to Venezuelan migrants],” The Conversation, November 28, 2019, 
http://theconversation.com/asi-es-como-peru-cerro-sus-puertas-a-los-migrantes-venezolanos-127975. 
10 Janetsky, “Fears Stoke Backlash against Venezuelans in Peru.” 
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in global nationalism, often blamed for the outcomes of immigration attitudes,11 though 
this correlation excludes the historical context between two nations. Still, these 
international trends highlight the importance of investigating immigration attitudes 
throughout the world. Moreover, although mass migration has caused worldwide 
catastrophes, there has been little sociological emphasis in the study of immigrant reception 
attitudes; current studies often focus narrowly on abstract, individual ideas, such as 
nativism, xenophobia, racism, and discrimination. Because these theories may not capture 
comprehensive explanations that account for environmental and historical variables, they 
have limited application to real-world scenarios.  
Other, more systematically oriented investigations have analyzed the mechanisms 
by which state and institutional policy is shaped by focusing on causes of migrations and 
immigration control, integration of new populations, and reasons for xenophobia, but they 
have not attempted to identify the underlying causes for variation in citizen and state 
attitudes toward immigration. These studies generally assume that the negative effects of 
mass migration on a receiving nation have made the migrants a scapegoat for that nation’s 
troubles. Thus, through a historical lens, this research explores the reasons for variation in 
attitudes by looking at the reception of Venezuelan migrants entering Colombia and Peru, 
which could reveal the key factors that enable a persistent welcoming demeanor, 
indifference, or even a rejection of newcomers in Latin American and other parts of the 
world. 
Although much scholarly literature addresses attitudes toward immigrants within 
the last ten years, Latin American cases have been largely ignored. Most studies have 
focused on North America, particularly the United States, as well as Europe and the Middle 
East, where Syria and its neighbors lead the discussion. Though these cases provide insight, 
Latin America offers a unique setting and a new perspective on historical migratory 
interactions between nations. Additionally, this regional context allows for control of 
cultural diversity and proximity, variables that are often assumed to drive variation in 
                                                 
11 Giovanni Peri, Riccardo Turati, and Simone Moriconi, “The Impact of Immigration on EU 
Countries’ Nationalistic Sentiments,” The Conversation, last updated May 28, 2019, 
http://theconversation.com/the-impact-of-immigration-on-eu-countries-nationalistic-sentiments-117632. 
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reception attitudes. Examining Colombia’s acceptance of Venezuelan immigrants, despite 
the tremendous economic and social burden, can help us identify the conditions that may 
help other countries solve immigration crises.  
In addition to providing regional context, an understanding of historical 
rapprochement between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries may help place 
a global emphasis on similar phenomena. Unfortunately, though the Venezuelan exodus is 
poised to overtake the Syrian refugee crisis as the greatest humanitarian migration issue in 
the world, this region has not received nearly as much attention, making it the “largest and 
most underfunded” refugee crisis in modern history.12 The current Venezuelan diaspora 
therefore provides a chance to explore attitude variation that, were it not for the present 
circumstances, would likely remain unexplored. 
Ultimately, it is imperative to explain the differences in Latin American countries’ 
reception of Venezuelan migrants because this crisis represents the largest intercontinental 
migration in South American history.13 The magnitude and speed of this diaspora is 
straining Latin American countries’ weak economies and inadequate infrastructures and is 
testing the patience of the receiving nations’ citizens. Furthermore, the enormous burden 
in the region is exacerbated by these states’ limited capacity to respond to such a 
phenomenon, which makes time an enemy. Exploring the differences in reception attitudes 
can provide crucial insights to help shape policy, debunk misconceptions about 
immigrants, and better equip governments to handle large influxes of people in both the 
short and long term. The results of this study may transform potentially catastrophic trends 
into constructive responses for regional states and other nations in comparable situations. 
Furthermore, examining relevant historical ties between migrant-sending and migrant-
receiving countries should yield a more accurate basis for predicting the behavior of a 
receiving nation during migratory phenomena.  
                                                 
12 Dany Bahar and Meagan Dooley, “Venezuela Refugee Crisis to Become the Largest and Most 
Underfunded in Modern History,” Brookings (blog), December 9, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
up-front/2019/12/09/venezuela-refugee-crisis-to-become-the-largest-and-most-underfunded-in-modern-
history/. 
13 Feline Freier and Parent, “Regional Response to the Venezuelan Exodus.” 56 
6 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This thesis broadly reviews scholars’ approaches to the study of attitudes toward 
immigration. Migration and immigration involve complex, intertwined factors that can 
affect each other. Exploring different areas of study reveals the salient conversations within 
migratory reception attitudes. Additionally, to understand current phenomena, we must 
investigate how these factors have historically functioned together. Some of the most 
prominent literature attempts to explain nativist or extreme nationalist attitudes toward 
immigrants, and is spread across disciplines including psychology, sociology, economics, 
and political science, to name a few. In an effort to reconcile these findings into a 
comprehensive and cohesive argument, the major explanations are segregated here into 
economic, social, and political frameworks.  
The economic theories focus on how citizens’ concerns about the fiscal impact of 
migrants affects attitudes. In general, economic theories investigate the tangible effects of 
immigration on the economy and the resulting attitudes. Sometimes economic fears are 
substantiated by labor-market competition; other times, however, they are speculative and 
make citizens less receptive to refugees. The misconception that immigrants are taking jobs 
away from citizens motivates this theoretical approach. Economic theories related to 
migration can be driven by data but also by perceived financial fears. 
A separate set of theories focuses on personal behavior, using social frameworks to 
explore the marginalization of external groups and offering individual explanations and 
sociological conclusions. These findings look at how differentiation toward others 
develops and manifests in groups and individuals. Furthermore, this literature scrutinizes 
preconceived notions, group dynamics, cultural factors, and perceptions of identity, among 
other topics, to uncover factors that shape human behavior in the context of migration and 
immigration. These theories adapt general, applicable hypotheses to the context of 
immigration dynamics to draw predictable outcomes.  
Lastly, political arguments probe the influence of rhetoric on a population and 
political positions of elites. Scholars in this debate identify how politicians use nationalism 
to manipulate attitudes toward immigrants. Although not always the case, fear can be 
7 
encouraged or downplayed by political elites and the media, and political messages can 
mobilize national sentiment against mass newcomers and refugees. Findings may reveal 
whether the feelings of a population were influenced by external forces, and whether these 
responses were preexisting or created by political actors.  
1. Economic Theories  
Variation in attitudes toward immigrants can be explained economically by factors, 
such as material self-interest and fiscal burden on the state.14 These economic theories 
drive citizens’ fears and their socioeconomic perceptions of how refugees impact the 
national economy. If economic factors are responsible for people’s attitudes toward 
refugees, then the expectation is that citizens respond to job losses, increased taxes, scarcity 
of public goods, and class stratification by blaming refugees. Thus, material self-interest 
theory seeks to determine if immigration poses a real threat to a citizen’s earnings by 
examining the labor market.  
On the other hand, the theory of fiscal burden examines the financial strain that an 
external population imposes on a state by looking at quantifiable data, such as taxes. 
However, qualitative data may also play a role, such as natives’ expectations about 
migrants’ effects on the economy, which influences their attitude toward immigrants. In 
some literature, socioeconomic principles are used to evaluate an individual’s function on 
his or her broad economic environment. Because of the complementary relationship 
between social and economic variables, these theories can fall somewhere between the 
economic and social frameworks, so they may appear in either theoretical approach. 
Regarding labor-market competition, Kenneth Scheve and Matthew Slaughter 
studied a model in which immigrants could seamlessly substitute a native citizen’s labor 
position. With this model, they found that an inflow of low-skill laborers would hurt labor 
opportunities for natives of the same skill level because the market would be flooded with 
extra labor, would produce a surplus of available workers, and would lower natives’ wages. 
                                                 
14 Jens Hainmueller and Daniel J. Hopkins, “Public Attitudes toward Immigration,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 17, no. 1 (2014): 227, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818. 
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Thus, the study predicted that low-skill natives are more likely to oppose immigration due, 
at least in part, to material self-interest. This research identified a citizen’s fear of being 
replaced by an immigrant with a similar skill set as central to the attitude variation.15 In 
cases of either low- or high-income immigration, the benefactors would be groups on the 
opposite social stratus in the receiving nation because the supply and demand of available 
laborers would create an imbalance favoring workers in lower supply. Therefore, if high-
skilled immigrants were arriving, low-skilled citizens would benefit most, and vice versa. 
For these reasons, among others, the Venezuelan case should reveal key factors in reception 
attitudes, since those who have crossed into neighboring borders have come from various 
income levels. Taking these variables into consideration and looking into each nation’s 
labor market may reveal how equipped the country is to welcome immigrants and how this 
affects variation in attitudes.  
Within the economic theories, one socially collective approach focuses on the 
financial burden immigrants place on society. This theory holds that attitudes toward 
immigration are based on the belief that immigrants bear a net burden on society, 
particularly on the welfare system.16 This view departs from the labor-market competition 
theory and is also based on the premise that citizens think the welfare system will be 
strained by migrants. Consequently, the stronger the belief that the system will be strained, 
the more likely citizens will reject immigration. This is a particularly interesting 
perspective considering the frailty of the Latin American states that have absorbed these 
populations. With current reactions ranging from welcomeness to xenophobia, there seem 
to be some correlations between this theory and Peru’s immigrant-rejecting attitude.17  
In supporting research, Giovanni Facchini and Anna Mayda identified that 
wealthier natives are more likely to show decreased support for immigration of unskilled 
                                                 
15 Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, “Labor Market Competition and Individual 
Preferences over Immigration Policy,” Review of Economics and Statistics 83, no. 1 (2001): 133–45, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003465301750160108. 
16 Christian Dustmann and Ian P. Preston, “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes to 
Immigration,” The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 7, no. 1 (2007), https://doi.org/10.2202/
1935-1682.1655. 
17 Rivadeneyra, “How Peru Closed its Doors.” 
9 
laborers because they are perceived as a net burden.18 However, the same study found that, 
in some instances, young, unskilled immigrants are seen as the solution to aging 
populations in countries where the welfare systems are fractured. Additionally, a 2003 
European Social Survey found that high-skilled workers favored all forms of immigration 
without rejecting an inflow of same-skill-level immigrants.19 This view pits immigrants 
and natives against each other in the economic sector, assuming there is direct competition. 
Although economic theories of attitudes toward immigrants tend to focus on individual-
level variation, they offer potential insights for examining differences in reception across 
countries. In particular, they suggest that attitudes might be a function of the structure of 
the economy of the receiving country, or of the economic configuration of the immigrants. 
Therefore, nations with strained economies or those that have larger low-skilled labor 
sectors might be more unwelcoming of immigrants.  
In a sociological lean toward the economic approach, Jack Citrin et al. found that 
there is no substantial evidence that citizens’ economic situations influence their attitude 
on immigration. Instead, the study treats the national economy and national identity as 
social constructs, pointing to scapegoating as a possible trigger for spite toward a new 
group of immigrants, on the grounds that citizens believe the national economy or the 
national identity is in peril.20 Additionally, Rima Wilkes, Neil Guppy, and Lily Farris show 
that while restrictions on immigration increase in times of economic downturn, the 
correlation between economic self-interest and immigration is weak.21 Ultimately, their 
findings suggest that citizens are not responding to self-interest but rather to their social 
perceptions, be it national social constructs or misinformed statistics, under which they 
                                                 
18 Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda, “Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes 
toward Immigrants? Evidence across Countries,” The Review of Economics and Statistics 91, no. 2 (2009): 
295–314, https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.91.2.295. 
19 Hainmueller and Hopkins, “Public Attitudes toward Immigration,” 228. 
20 Jack Citrin et al., “Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic 
Motivations,” The Journal of Politics 59, no. 3 (1997): 858–81, https://doi.org/10.2307/2998640. 
21 Rima Wilkes, Neil Guppy, and Lily Farris, “‘No Thanks, We’re Full’: Individual Characteristics, 
National Context, and Changing Attitudes toward Immigration,” International Migration Review 42, no. 2 
(2008): 302–29, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2008.00126.x. 
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formulate various attitudes.22 These responses tend to be rooted in fear rather than in 
substantiated, data-driven statistics. 
2. Social Theories 
Approaches that examine reception attitudes using social theoretical perspectives 
focus on citizens’ concerns regarding their interactions with the social and cultural 
environment. These studies examine ethnocentrism, nativism, education, national identity, 
and cultural proximity. Although these theories cater to social observations, economic and 
political circumstances sometimes breed a social environment in which the receiving 
nation’s citizens perceive immigration as a threat to their way of life. More specifically, 
scholars have looked at natives’ culture, ethnicity, and identity as factors that are threatened 
by immigration. Therefore, these theories explore the boundaries outside the individual 
citizen to find correlation between attitudes and cultural elements. These theories show 
that, rather than relying on quantifiable evidence, citizens are more likely to personally 
reject immigration if they believe the nation, or an aspect of it, will be disrupted. In Peru, 
this theory helps explain widespread fears that Venezuelans increase delinquency, even 
though statistics show that they commit less than 1 percent of the country’s crimes.23  
Keeping with social observations, research from Paul Sniderman, Louk 
Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior found that cultural factors—such as speaking a different 
language—were a bigger factor in shaping attitudes than immigrants’ economic status. 
These cultural differences were evident across diverse countries in which the study 
identified a strong sense of prejudice against immigrant groups. In Venezuela’s case, its 
neighbors speak the same language, Spanish, albeit with a different accent, which may 
explain immediate degradation in some cases, even when physical appearances are 
indistinguishable from native citizens. Additionally, the prejudicial sentiment was equally 
distributed against multiple external groups, calling attention to the prominence of 
ethnocentrism as a source for attitudinal influence. This research also found a strong sense 
                                                 
22 Citrin et al., “Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform.” 
23 Janetsky, “Fears Stoke Backlash against Venezuelans in Peru.” 
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of national identity and a population that felt its culture was threatened in different ways.24 
It was acknowledged that because cultures are indeed different, misperceptions cannot be 
the sole culprit of attitude differences. In one example, Robert Ford found that immigrants 
with greater cultural similarities were consistently preferred in Britain, meaning groups 
with comparable skin color and race.25 This observation is particularly interesting because 
Venezuela shares a strong heritage with Colombia and Ecuador but not as strong a heritage 
with Peru. These dynamics may be influential, but a proper analysis requires a deeper 
understanding of cultural linkages that transcend singular events.  
Despite shared characteristics between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving 
nations, there are differences in social perceptions that play a prominent role in defining 
attitudes toward refugees. Natalie Masuoka and Jane Junn identified survey questions in 
which Americans’ attitudes toward immigration policy varied significantly depending on 
the survey-taker’s race or identity. They recognized through surveys that, in America, there 
is a hierarchy with white citizens at the top, followed by Asian citizens, and with Latino 
and Black citizens at the bottom.26 These racial groupings were based on the historical 
context in which the United States developed into a nation. Similarly, though Venezuelans 
could be generally characterized as more homogeneous to regional neighbors, historical 
ethnic and racial divides have carried over from colonial times based on perceived cultural 
superiority, which may factor into attitudes toward immigrants.  
Although cultural supremacy may still be present in some fashion, higher native 
education seems not to play a role in this calculation. In one study, education levels were 
positively correlated to increased tolerance levels, even when there are existing negative 
                                                 
24 Paul M. Sniderman, Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior, “Predisposing Factors and Situational 
Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities,” American Political Science Review 98, no. 1 
(2004): 35–49, https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305540400098X. 
25 Robert Ford, “Acceptable and Unacceptable Immigrants: How Opposition to Immigration in Britain 
Is Affected by Migrants’ Region of Origin,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 37, no. 7 (2011): 
1017–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2011.572423. 
26 Natalie Masuoka and Jane Junn, The Politics of Belonging: Race, Public Opinion, and Immigration 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 188. 
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feelings about an out-group.27 In contrast, another study found that the correlation between 
education level and immigration attitudes depends more on cultural values and the 
perceived impact of immigration on social life.28 In addition to the capacity of a social 
landscape to influence perceptions, immutable, individual characteristics, such as race and 
ethnicity play a prominent role in migration dynamics for both the citizens and the 
immigrants. More recognizable, innate traits, such as skin color or accent, present an 
opportunity for external mobilizing forces, such as politics or media to propagate racism 
and xenophobia. In Venezuela’s refugee case, noting ethnic and racial compositions of 
receiving nations may help identify which of these visible traits can lead to a more 
welcoming environment, especially given prevalent social tensions stemming from race 
and ethnicity throughout the world.  
As important as it is to recognize the role of inherent physical traits, some relevant 
socioeconomic variables are often neglected, such as factor mobility,29 the size of the 
country, and the education level of native workers.30 These variables, although not directly 
correlated at times, provide insight into how attitudes are formed. For example, in some 
cases the citizens affected by immigration are elites, and therefore have the power to 
control the salience of immigration as a societal issue. This dynamic gives a small segment 
of the population disproportionate power over the native poor and most immigrants. Still, 
comparing the number of migrants with the number of citizens in receiving nations will 
paint a more accurate picture of the social landscape that these nations are dealing with. 
These social factors all influence receiving attitudes in an integrated manner and scholars 
                                                 
27 Lawrence Bobo and Frederick Licari, “Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of 
Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect,” The Public Opinion Quarterly 53, no. 3 (1989): 285–
308, https://doi.org/10.1086/269154. 
28 Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low-Skilled 
Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment,” American Political Science Review 104, no. 1 (2010): 
61–84, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990372. 
29 In this context, factor mobility refers to the feasibility and capacity of the receiving country to 
absorb human capital (immigrants) and successfully integrate them into the labor force. Countries with a 
higher Factor Mobility should yield higher economic prosperity. 
30 Jens Hainmueller and Michael J. Hiscox, “Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes toward 
Immigration in Europe,” International Organization 61, no. 2 (2007): 399–442, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0020818307070142. 
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suggest that they should not be ignored, even when looking at a strong correlation between 
two independent variables within migratory phenomena.  
3. Political Theories 
Political theories focus on explaining how and if the intentional manipulation of 
societal perceptions and conditions by external actors can lead to negative attitudes toward 
refugees. For example, a poor labor market may fuel political rhetoric that incites a 
discriminatory sentiment in the receiving country. These agendas can adapt to any available 
social or economic factors to achieve a desired end. Thus, in exploring political 
perspectives, it is important to recognize that although certain socioeconomic factors can 
form attitudes, it is the capability of political actors to sway citizens that distinguishes these 
theories from those in the previous two categories. In Colombia’s case and seemingly 
against all odds, the government has been sending favorable messages about the 
Venezuelan immigrants—with the president referring to them as “brothers”—and it 
appears to have had a positive effect on the citizenry’s attitudes.31  
Anthony Smith recognizes ethnicity as an “instrument” that can be used by the 
powerful to advance their agendas.32 For this reason, political influence must be taken into 
account when examining citizens’ attitudes. Masuoka and Junn found that, through 
political mechanisms, citizens can be made to feel superior to immigrants, which can lead 
them to reject qualitatively different newcomers. In England, for example, some political 
parties have a strong tie to antiimmigration attitudes.33 This appears to be the case in Peru 
as well, where antiimmigration rhetoric has been accepted by many citizens and manifests 
in, for instance, use of derogatory terms. Consequently, Venezuelans in Peru are called 
                                                 
31 “Migración venezolana es por dictadura y no para promover ideología [Venezuelan migration is due 
to dictatorship and not to promote ideology],” El Tiempo, May 4, 2019, https://www.eltiempo.com/politica/
gobierno/duque-dice-que-la-migracion-venezolana-se-debe-a-la-dictadura-357308. 
32 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 20. 
33 Jeannette Money and Miriam Feldblum, “Fences and Neighbors: The Political Geography of 
Immigration Control,” SAIS Review xx, no. 1 (2000): 205–13; Bhikhu Parekh, “The Politicization of Race 
Relations,” Government and Opposition 25, no. 02 (1990): 256–60, https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0017257X00016687. 
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Veneco, a term that ensures their marginalization in society.34 These theories are relevant 
regionally at the moment, since right-wing governments in South America have recently 
implemented restrictive immigration policies.  
Even when there is no outward display of animosity, political factors can be used 
to influence emotion by drawing on a native’s sense of national identity. Matthew Wright, 
Jack Citrin, and Jonathan Wand explored Americans’ perception of national identity in 
civic and ethnic terms to determine if it correlated with favoring immigration, according to 
whom the natives perceived were in fact “American.”35 Their study concluded that civic 
conceptions of national identity led to a higher acceptance of immigration. In another 
American case, Ted Brader, Nicholas Valentine, and Elizabeth Suhay showed that 
Americans react more negatively to news of Latino immigrants than European immigrants, 
proving there is a clear difference depending on migrants are from.36 In Europe, a study 
proved the same case in Switzerland, as Turks and Yugoslavs were rejected more 
frequently than European naturalization applicants.37 These cases indicate that Latin 
American countries are more likely to accept immigrants who are most culturally and 
ethnically similar and less likely to accept those with ethnic and national differences, or 
who do not share a race and history with the receiving nation.  
                                                 
34 Janetsky, “Fears Stoke Backlash against Venezuelans in Peru”; “In Latin America, Fears of Rising 
Discrimination, Xenophobia against Venezuelan Migrants,” NBC News, October 18, 2019, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latin-america-fears-rising-discrimination-xenophobia-against-
venezuelan-migrants-n1068536. 
35 Matthew Wright, Jack Citrin, and Jonathan Wand, “Alternative Measures of American National 
Identity: Implications for the Civic‐Ethnic Distinction,” Political Psychology 33, no. 4 (2012): 469–82, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00885.x. 
36 Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, and Elizabeth Suhay, “What Triggers Public Opposition to 
Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat,” American Journal of Political Science 52, 
no. 4 (2008): 959–78. 
37 Jens Hainmueller and Dominik Hangartner, “Who Gets a Swiss Passport? A Natural Experiment in 
Immigrant Discrimination,” American Political Science Review 107, no. 1 (2013): 159–87, https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0003055412000494. 
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B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
For several years, Peru hosted the second largest number of Venezuelan 
immigrants; recent policies, however, have more clearly differentiated Peru’s current 
response from Colombia’s.38 Although the Peruvian and Colombian governments are both 
considered right wing, their political messages have diverged. Likewise, economic 
explanations seem insufficient, given the unwavering commitment with which Colombia 
has received its neighbors. An overlooked variable may lie in the historical interactions 
between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving nations. In the 1970s and 1980s, when 
Colombia was ravaged by drug wars and violence, many Colombian refugees were 
welcomed by Venezuela. This reciprocity seen between Colombians and Venezuelans is 
not echoed in Peru’s migratory situation.  
In this thesis I argue that—beyond social, economic, and political factors—several 
decisive historical interactions between Colombia and Venezuela generated 
rapprochement, making it possible for reciprocity to exist during catastrophes in which one 
nation’s citizens depended on the neighboring country for asylum. This reciprocity has 
dampened the catastrophic effect of the current large-scale migratory disaster, resulting in 
greater acceptance and tolerance compared to nations that do not share historical ties, such 
as Venezuela and Peru. This hypothesis deviates from common theories because it looks 
comprehensively at the historical events that solidify bonhomie between the citizens of two 
countries, particularly at the border. Thus far, most studies have disregarded the historical 
connections between two countries; this hypothesis seeks to prove that these interactions 
are an overarching mechanism that transcends social, economic, and political frameworks, 
and gives them direction.  
Theoretically, studies cover reasons for feelings of acceptance, though there is a 
timeless, overgeneralized aspect to these explanations. In one study, empathy was found to 
be an important component of acceptance of immigrants, especially as information is 
disseminated through the media. The study showed evidence that public opinion could be 
                                                 
38 Feline Freier and Parent, “Regional Response to the Venezuelan Exodus.” 
16 
positively affected by media coverage, giving weight to the political theories.39 Early 
research in the present case supports this hypothesis, as Peru’s media have been 
disseminating restrictive and fearful immigration messages while Colombia’s 
communication platforms have remained positive and accepting.  
While Colombia has a higher population than Peru, Peru is geographically larger.40 
Each nation could substantiate reasons for rejecting immigration based on numerical 
statistics, limited resources, and claims of land scarcity. However, at the heart of this 
dilemma is more than geography, politics, systems, and mechanisms—it is people. Because 
of the power of public opinion, governments have a much stronger say in their citizens’ 
attitudes toward immigrant and immigration-related issues. Recent protests and riots 
indicate the citizens’ true feelings of discontent. It would be naïve to say that Venezuelans 
have been the root cause of these sentiments, but it would also be naïve to discount their 
effect on the receiving populations. In Brazil, for instance, more than one thousand 
Venezuelans who had settled across the northern town of Boa Vista were forcefully 
removed by locals who were outraged at a crime committed by an immigrant.41 
Ultimately, arriving at the most accurate conclusion requires careful identification 
of the historical factors that have led to a welcoming reception and tolerant attitude toward 
immigrants. Available data notwithstanding, migration is an organic and dynamic 
phenomenon with multiple dimensions and evolving characteristics. Therefore, the key in 
explaining variation lies in considering each of the aforementioned theoretical approaches 
when examining historical data, and it is possible that these frameworks may overlap. 
Finally, one should not expect a monocausal explanation; human interactions are 
                                                 
39 Benjamin J. Newman et al., “Easing the Heavy Hand: Humanitarian Concern, Empathy, and 
Opinion on Immigration,” British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 3 (2015): 583–607, https://doi.org/
10.1017/S0007123413000410. 
40 “Population Density,” World Bank, accessed February 16, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/EN.POP.DNST; “Peru Size Comparison: How Big Is Peru?” How to Peru, May 30, 2010, 
https://www.howtoperu.com/peru-size-comparison-how-big-is-peru/. 
41 Jo Griffin, “‘The Strain Is too Much’: Venezuelan Exodus Has Brazil at Breaking Point,” Guardian, 
December 24, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/dec/24/venezuelan-exodus-
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complicated, and the explanations behind human attitudes can be attributed, to varying 
degrees, to each framework.  
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The theoretical explanations surrounding varied attitudes toward immigrants 
suggest that this topic is best addressed by exploring relevant historical interactions 
between the sending and receiving nations, examining internal and external environmental 
factors, and investigating the states’ responses to the current immigration crisis. This will 
help avoid simultaneity bias, which makes it difficult to know the difference between the 
dependent and independent variables.42 This research therefore focuses on identifying the 
factors that affect the acceptance of immigrants and the historically relevant circumstances 
within the Venezuelan case. The working paper by Corrales is used as a guide for 
measuring reception attitudes in Colombia and Peru.  
In Corrales’s study, the six Latin American countries investigated were Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Trinidad and Tobago. These nations were 
selected because of their varying degrees of receptivity toward immigrants, enabling the 
research to display a wide range of variation. The factors that were measured used data 
sets, such as overall immigration policy, ease of availability of legal and social assistance, 
and public opinion. Using this data, the countries were rated favorably if their policies 
facilitated immigrants’ access to essential resources, while public opinion captured the 
direct response of a nation’s citizens toward the new population. The results of this ongoing 
study have shown that Colombia and Argentina have been the most welcoming nations; 
Trinidad and Tobago earned the lowest score, followed by Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, and 
Chile. Peru, which has the second most Venezuelan immigrants, was excluded from 
Corrales’s research.43 
While Corrales’s study shows that there is measurable variation in receptive 
attitudes toward immigrants, the reasoning behind the attitudes is only speculative. 
                                                 
42 Hainmueller and Hopkins, “Public Attitudes toward Immigration,” 243. 
43 Corrales, “Responses to the Venezuelan Migration Crisis.” 
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Although the research did not explore causal mechanisms, the study acknowledges 
nativism, security issues, economic hardship, and xenophobia as explanations for the 
Venezuelan mass migration crisis. These unfortunate occurrences are all worth an 
investigation that goes beyond mere correlation and that, instead, attempts to establish a 
basis of causation by building upon Corrales’s initial study. Even with identifiable data, 
the historical context of Venezuela’s migratory response has been largely ignored, with 
only a few articles characterizing Colombian attitudes as a reciprocal response. For this 
reason, this research also examines state interactions between the sending and receiving 
nations, starting from the mid-nineteenth century, a pivotal period for migration between 
Colombia and Venezuela. 
1. Case Selection 
For this research, Colombia and Peru were chosen as the case studies for several 
reasons. First, these countries are the nearest Spanish-speaking nations that have taken in 
the greatest number of migrants. Second, Colombia and Peru are different in land size, 
ethnic composition, and population density, but share the same language and colonial 
origins, and a comparable border crossed by migrants. These national similarities provide 
more control over variables that could affect attitudes. Whereas traditional case studies 
would require controlling multiple elements, exploring these two contrasting receiving 
nations should yield more observable results. 
Another reason for the selection of these countries is that current polls and studies, 
such as Corrales’s study, regard Colombia as the most friendly to Venezuelan immigrants. 
In other sources, Peru could be qualified as indifferent or hostile toward the refugees. 
Additionally, current evidence shows that though Peru initially welcomed immigrants, it 
gradually began to reject them. This variation allows the study to consider the factors 
surrounding these changes and compare them against Colombia’s response. Additionally, 
although these two nations have been chosen for observation, other neighboring and 
nonregional countries may inform the discussion when their responses help to clarify 
attitudes and attitude formation.  
19 
Finally, the national identities in Colombia and Peru are strongly rooted in the 
development of modern South America. For example, less than two hundred years ago 
Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador were part of a unified country called Gran Colombia, 
even if just for eleven years. Conversely, Peru currently holds more indigenous 
populations, as well as a large sector of citizens of Chinese and Japanese descent, making 
it more culturally distinct from Venezuela. These relevant differences may help explain 
attitude variation.  
2. Research Elements and Timeframe 
This research considered political response, public opinion, media dissemination, 
and policy changes over time. The timeframe of the current migratory response, and 
therefore of the data collected, was from 2015, when the crisis began, through 2020, when 
this thesis was written. The timeframe for the historical analysis began in the mid-twentieth 
century, investigating relevant interactions between Venezuela and the two receiving 
nations. Additional information was drawn from public opinion surveys, newspaper 
articles on government and public responses, country reports, and official immigration data 
from national and international organizations. The products of these sources were 
categorized into social, political, economic, and historical contexts; the case studies 
examined these four main aspects of society within each country and comparatively 
between the two countries. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized into two empirical chapters. The first considers Colombia’s 
welcoming reception and the second turns to Peru to evaluate its deviation from an initially 
positive response toward Venezuelan immigrants and refugees. Each chapter begins by 
describing the central defining features of the country’s reception toward Venezuelan 
immigrants and refugees, and then considers economic, social, political, and historical 
explanations for these attitudes. The final chapter then analyzes how and why the responses 
varied, summarizing the findings and leading explanations, considering implications, 
recognizing applicability to other regions, and offering policy recommendations.  
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II. COLOMBIA: BUILDING TOLERANCE AND ACCEPTANCE 
THROUGH HISTORICALLY ESTABLISHED RECIPROCITY  
In 2015, the most recent wave of Venezuelan refugees started fleeing their 
economically devastated homeland. Once the wealthiest country in the region, Venezuela 
witnessed a steady rise in poverty in the years prior to the exodus but was still inhabitable 
by the non-elite population. Now, the nation is experiencing an unprecedented crime wave 
and a shortage of food and necessities, and 96 percent of its people live in poverty, making 
it arduous for the average citizen to survive. Consequently, by early 2020, Colombia had 
taken in 1.5 million Venezuelan migrants, amounting to 30 of the five million total 
displaced persons.44 
Through this chaos—the worst migratory catastrophe South America has ever 
seen—Colombia has a steady and reliable neighbor, offering shelter, hosting Venezuelan 
refugees, and enacting laws that have eased the gravity of the situation. Most Latin 
American nations have now virtually closed their borders to the Venezuelan refugees; why 
has Colombia been so welcoming? And why does Colombia continue to allow Venezuelan 
immigration five years into the crisis even when all economic, social, and political 
indicators point to the seemingly devastating consequences of flooding a struggling state 
with desperate migrants?45  
Initial generosity notwithstanding, the welcoming demeanor in countries, such as 
Peru and Ecuador wore off a few years into the crisis. By mid-2019, these countries had 
enacted regulations that made it nearly impossible for Venezuelan migrants to cross their 
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borders.46 However, amid declining support for the refugees, Colombia remained steadfast 
in its sympathy for its neighbor. Instead of continuing the regional trend of focusing inward 
and bolstering security at the border, Colombia’s response went contrary to logic: it opened 
its entry points, offered citizenship to twenty-four thousand Venezuelan children and 
newborns, and propagated a message of fraternity with the new immigrants through 
President Iván Duque.47 In addition to a warm welcome from Colombian citizens, the 
government also maintained a message of solidarity without regard for how or why the 
Venezuelans had to flee. 
It is puzzling that Colombia has been so accommodating and has remained 
consistently benevolent on social, political, and economic fronts. To understand why 
Colombia has been so hospitable and receptive, this research turns to the past in search of 
influential historical ties. A superficial glance into Colombia and Venezuela’s historical 
interactions suggests linkages created during pivotal events in each nation that strengthened 
the social fabric that unites them. The historical migratory patterns between Colombia and 
Venezuela show that their strong rapprochement has, thus far, facilitated an unwavering 
commitment toward the welfare of the refugees by enabling conditions, especially at their 
shared border, that have generated a reciprocating bonhomie toward each other’s struggling 
and disadvantaged migratory citizens. Moreover, this reciprocity seems to transcend 
political, social, or economic explanations. As nations like Peru and Ecuador have now 
increased restrictions for additional Venezuelans to cross their borders, Colombia’s 
counterintuitive response warrants investigation. 
                                                 
46 Reuters, “Venezuelan Migrants Flood into Ecuador”; “Venezuelan Migrants Face Tougher Border 
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A. COLOMBIA’S HISTORICAL RELATIONS WITH VENEZUELA
1. The Foundations of Bonhomie
The historical relations between Colombia and Venezuela began when they were 
experimentally unified, along with Ecuador, into a country named Gran Colombia. Initially 
consolidated by “The Liberator,” Simon Bolivar, in 1819, the experiment failed in 1830 
after just eleven years.48 Even though Bolivar’s project country dissolved into three 
independent nations (see Figure 1), they maintained the same flag colors and many cultural 
aspects, but more so at the Venezuela–Colombia divide. Through time, immigration at this 
border had gone mostly unnoticed because of the focus on wars, the lack of statistical data, 
and the political indifference by those in power.49 However, these migratory flows started 
gaining significance around the mid-twentieth century with Venezuela’s economic boom 
and Colombia’s 34 percent population increase over a short span, growing from 11.5 
million people in 1951 to 17.5 million in 1964.50 The historical relations between these 
nations could be described as interdependent, though not necessarily by intentional design. 
While both countries have had periods of downturns and prosperity, they have provided 
each other with some balance and stability, especially beginning in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  
48 Roberto Arana and Héctor Galeano David, “The Colombia-Venezuela Relations,” Memorias, no. 24 
(December 2014): 76–97. 
49 Susan Berglund, “The ‘Musiues’ in Venezuela: Immigration Goals and Reality, 1936–1961” (PhD 
diss., UMass Amherst, 2014), 32. 
50 David Bushnell, Colombia: Una nación a pesar de sí misma [Colombia: A nation in spite of itself], 
trans. Claudia Montilla V., 1st ed. (Bogotá, Colombia: Ariel, 2017), 443. 
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Figure 1. Gran Colombia 1821–1830, and the lands it split into.51  
Colombia has suffered catastrophic periods of violence and uncertainty from the 
mid-1940s until recently. Consequently, the nation has been mostly an exporter of 
immigrants, and an importer to a much lesser extent. Throughout the twentieth century, the 
devastating effects of political violence, the various guerrilla groups, and narcotraffickers 
have kept the country in an unceasing state of chaos. The most prominent cataclysm 
occurred after the assassination of Colombian presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán 
in 1947, which led to a ten-year period of extreme violence known as La Violencia.52 As 
the nation recovered from that chaos, communist groups, such as FARC (the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia) and ELN (the National Liberation Army) waged a civil war 
in the mid-1960s that lasted fifty-two years; the war claimed over 220,000 people and 
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displaced 7.6 million more.53 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, narcotrafficking 
empowered drug kingpins and violent organizations, placing ordinary citizens at peril.54 
As a result, within the last forty years approximately one-million Colombians have 
migrated to Venezuela.55 These sociopolitical afflictions have resulted in a steady stream 
of continuous emigration. Throughout these hardships, Colombian citizens have endured 
the brunt of the brutality and have grown strong, numb, and wiser, often with the 
unheralded help of Venezuela. 
During these rough times for Colombia, Venezuela, though not without incident, 
experienced great economic growth mainly because of its oil reserves. Consequently, the 
nation became the wealthiest South American state and the preferred destination for 
regional immigrants, with Colombians leading in numbers (see Figure 2). Venezuela’s 
affluence enabled Colombian immigrants to fill jobs in various sectors of the economy, but 
mainly agriculture, construction, domestic services, and industry.56 Ultimately, the 
Colombian difficulties, coupled with Venezuelan prosperity, created opportunities for both 
neighboring nations to test receiving attitudes and display reciprocity.  
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Figure 2. Immigration to Venezuela by geographic origin.57  
2. Economic Facilitation 
By 1945, when Colombia was dealing with agrarian reforms,58 Venezuela was 
prosperous because of demand for petroleum, an industry that required a large labor force. 
The most motivated and economical personnel available to fill this void happened to be 
Colombian workers, who then relocated mainly to the Venezuelan states of Táchira, 
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Merida, and Zulia.59 Seizing on the opportunity to improve their quality of life and escape 
La Violencia, Colombian laborers rushed into neighboring Venezuela. Once in place, they 
were considered guest workers, and established a seasonal migratory routine to satisfy job 
vacancies. This recurring labor cycle was the beginning of a social amalgamation that 
would bolster familiarity between residents of towns on both sides of the border. This 
dynamic is elaborately captured by the description of Mexican braceros in the United States 
in that “[t]here is nothing more permanent than temporary foreign workers.”60 
Venezuelan leaders noticed the strong economic growth and the increase in 
migratory movements even though the country was, in fact, experiencing internal political 
turmoil. Thus, despite a coup d’état in 1948 that led to a decade-long military dictatorship, 
the Venezuelan government passed a large-scale open immigration law, making it 
significantly easier for undocumented workers to legally integrate into the economy.61 In 
addition to favorable immigration policies, the receiving population was accepting of 
foreigners. As a result, Venezuela’s “first scientifically organized public opinion poll” 
showed that Colombians were seen as “brothers” and not foreigners; 77 percent of 
respondents believed immigration would improve their financial situation.62  
The combination of Venezuela’s governmental support and its citizens’ approving 
disposition toward its national neighbors in the mid-twentieth century helped establish an 
identity in which Colombians and Venezuelans were practically indistinguishable. In fact, 
some Colombian workers would even pass as Venezuelans, enabling many of them to 
59 Mary M. Kritz, “The Impact of International Migration on Venezuelan Demographic and Social 
Structure,” The International Migration Review 9, no. 4 (1975): 526, https://doi.org/10.2307/3002345; 
Megan Janetsky, “Here’s Why Colombia Opened its Arms to Venezuelan Migrants—Until Now,” Foreign 
Policy, January 14, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/14/heres-why-colombia-opened-its-arms-to-
venezuelan-migrants-until-now/. 
60 Philip L. Martin and Michael S. Teitelbaum, “The Mirage of Mexican Guest Workers,” Foreign 
Affairs, January 28, 2009, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/mexico/2001-11-01/mirage-mexican-
guest-workers; “There Is Nothing More Permanent than Temporary Foreign Workers,” Center for 
Immigration Studies, accessed August 2, 2020, https://cis.org/Report/There-Nothing-More-Permanent-
Temporary-Foreign-Workers. 
61 Kritz, “Impact of International Migration,” 517 
62 Berglund, “The ‘Musiues’ in Venezuela,” 35–36. 
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unlawfully remain within the country.63 Still, by the 1950s, most of these migrants were 
simply seeking opportunities in the oil, farming, and domestic services industries. In 
Colombia, La Violencia had altered the rural landscape and caused many farmers to lose 
their lands and experience “political manipulation.”64 It follows, then, that the 
disenfranchised of the era took their skills to a place where they were safe from persecution 
and insecurity. In many ways, this same dynamic is in effect with the Venezuelan exodus 
today, as refugees are escaping their state of poverty, violence, and political corruption to 
make a living in Colombia. The historical correlations with the current crisis are evident 
even from these early interactions, but, although they provide a strong foundation for the 
current Colombian neighborliness, more happened between then and now explain the 
current response.  
3. Government Cooperation  
It was not only the increased number of interactions between foreigners and citizens 
that facilitated a favorable immigration environment—it was also border dynamics. 
Although the journey to Venezuela required crossing an international boundary, these 
migrations were largely considered internal because they were short-distance and enabled 
low-skill workers to pursue geographically accessible opportunities across the border. 
These workers were largely illegal because they lacked the wherewithal to acquire the 
proper documents for legitimate work.65 Even so, they fulfilled vital economic roles and 
thus were not pressured to return home, encouraging many to stay permanently (see Figure 
3). By treating these migrations as internal, each nation was mitigating alienation and 
fostering bilateral relations. Once both nations recognized this working relationship and 
identified the need to address immigration, each government did its part to facilitate the 
smooth continuation of migratory patterns through partnerships and agreements of 
solidarity, setting a precedent for decades to come.  
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Figure 3. Permanency of immigrants in Venezuela, by origin.66 
Building off a cordial political relationship with Colombia at the time, Venezuela 
maintained a policy of open borders from 1947 to 1958.67 As a growing country, it needed 
workers and immigrants in different sectors of its economy at a time when its population 
was around five million. In addition to the large number of Europeans that arrived, an 
estimated one million Colombians made their way to Venezuela, though a great part 
returned after some time—a seasonal pattern that continued until the current migration 
started. As this mid-century border migration dynamic was producing favorable economic 
results, Venezuela’s policies were forging a resilient sociopolitical bond with Colombia’s 
government and the migrant workers. Venezuela not only opened its borders without any 
restrictions, it also espoused a pro-immigration political environment. As a result, 
66 Adapted from Berglund, “The ‘Musiues’ in Venezuela,” 110. 
67 Encyclopedia Britannica, s.v. “Venezuela—immigration and ethnic composition,” accessed July 
18, 2020, https://www.britannica.com/place/Venezuela. 
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Colombian presence in Venezuela increased dramatically, jumping from 41,000 in 1950 to 
88,000 in 1961.68  
By the end of the decade, both governments had signed a reaffirmation of 
friendship, with the intent to better track the border population and maintain a census. 
Although some of the terms of the agreement were not effectively or consistently 
employed, the nations were able to create a pact and emphasize a population in an area that 
had, until then, been largely disregarded. It was a deliberate attempt to formalize border 
relations, which established very permissive migratory conditions. Even after stringent 
measures were implemented to curb immigration in 1958, Colombians maintained a steady 
flow, filling farming jobs vacated by rural Venezuelans relocating to city centers. Thus, by 
1961, 18.1 percent of Venezuela’s immigrant population was composed of Colombians, 
making up the greatest number of Latin Americans in the country.69 Figure 4 shows the 
major events that affected migration between Colombia and Venezuela during this period. 
68 Berglund, “The ‘Musiues’ in Venezuela,” 200. 
69 Kritz, “Impact of International Migration,” 12. 
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Figure 4. Colombia–Venezuela significant interactive events, 1945–1961.70  
  
                                                 
70 Adapted from Berglund, “The ‘Musiues’ in Venezuela”; Kritz, “Impact of International Migration.” 
32 
The 1960s and 1970s brought more prosperity to Venezuela thanks to its oil boom. 
The country produced the second strongest gross national product in South America, and 
second in all of Latin America (see Figure 5). Colombia was not economically anemic, but 
financial stability for average citizens was implausible due to income inequality, the 
beginning of the drug trade, and a surge in radical political groups. Consequently, farmers 
and laborers left; in 1960, 117,377 Colombians officially lived outside the country, whereas 
by 1973 the total number was 556,683, most of whom resided in Venezuela.71  
 
Figure 5. GNP growth in Latin America, 1961–1970.72  
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4. Transnational Factors 
The 1970s also brought the rise of narcotraffickers, which placed Colombia as a 
global leader in the illegal drug trade. The illicit activities brought more violence while 
cartel kingpins gained power. The country became more dangerous, providing yet another 
reason for middle- and low-income citizens to flee. During this time, there was at least one 
city in Colombia in which migration to Venezuela was studied—Cartagena. Many of the 
300,000 Colombian residents that migrated to Venezuela in the 1970s hailed from 
Cartagena.73 One study captured that they greatly bolstered ties between both countries by 
productively contributing economically in both nations. In Venezuela, these workers were 
productive contributors to the local economy, enriching the host nation through the fruits 
of experienced laborers.74 Colombia benefitted, too, through remittances, which helped 
build cities, strengthened the local and national economies, and cemented a social rapport 
between the host and origin cities. National border lines blurred as the migrants formed a 
new intercultural community created by organic social translocations instead of political 
demarcations. Governments on both sides did remain involved in the synthetizations 
between their people by communicating with each other and prioritizing certain policies. 
Consequently, they continued to address the new social dynamic through joint declarations 
by their foreign ministers and a joint commission to study immigration. Figure 6 tracks the 
significant interactions between Colombia and Venezuela during this time period. 
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Figure 6. Colombia–Venezuela significant interactive events, 
1960s–1970s.75  
 
                                                 
75 Adapted from Berglund, “The ‘Musiues’ in Venezuela”; Ivy D. Hanchett, “Immigration and 
Economic Integration Case Studies: United States—Mexico and Venezuela—Colombia” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1994), 85. 
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While it has been mostly a one-sided migration flow, the so-called lost decade of 
the 1980s hurt Venezuela financially particularly hard because of a downturn in Latin 
American commodities. With plummeting oil prices, unemployment skyrocketed. To make 
matters worse, in 1989, the newly elected Venezuelan president, Carlos Andrés Pérez, 
implemented an economic model to replace industrialization by imports substitution, 
which provoked riots and violence due to the high cost of gas and transportation.76 As a 
result, Venezuela experienced a spike in emigration; the data suggests that Venezuelans 
sought Colombia for refuge, though they returned shortly after (see Figure 7). While it is 
difficult to trace exact destinations for migrants during this period, the known statistical 
data for previous years suggests that the same ebbs and flows continued, making Colombia 
the go-to nation for Venezuelans in hardship. Additionally, much of this migration was 
never captured in the receiving countries, and there were also Colombians returning home. 
The continuation of these migratory patterns between 1980 and 2000 kept a high 
level of interaction between Colombians and Venezuelans (see Figure 8). Toward the end 
of the 1990s, Venezuela turned toward socialism, from which some Colombian migrants 
benefited in the 2000s, until the Bolivarian state economically collapsed. By 2011, 70,000 
residents from the Colombian department of Arauca fled to due to armed conflict, arriving 
in a steady stream to the Venezuelan states of Zulia or Táchira.77 They were given housing 
and safety as Colombia grappled with more of the same violence due to armed groups, such 
as FARC. These benefits and the prospect of a peaceful life led migrants to see Venezuela 
as their permanent home. Thus, while Colombians were seasonal workers in the mid-
twentieth century, from approximately the 1970s onward they have made Venezuela their 
permanent home. 
76 “30 Years Ago, Venezuela Exploded,” Caracas Chronicles, February 27, 2019, 
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/02/27/30-years-ago-venezuela-exploded/. 
77 Arturo Wallace, “Desplazados en Colombia, refugiados en Venezuela [Displaced in Colombia, 




Net migration is red when the country has more emigration, and green if 
more immigration. Percentage change each year based off previous year. 
Figure 7. Venezuela net migration, 1980–2020.78  
 
Colombian net migration was cyclical but stable until 2000. 
Figure 8. Colombia net migration, 1980–2000.79 
                                                 
78 Source: “Venezuela Net Migration Rate 1950–2020,” Macro Trends, accessed August 5, 2020, 
https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/VEN/venezuela/net-migration. 
79 Source: Macro Trends. 
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B. HISTORICAL TIES, SOLIDARITY, AND THE VENEZUELAN 
MIGRATION CRISIS 
The current migration wave is the culmination of a downturn that began in the early 
2000s. However, the ongoing crisis dwarfs any previous crisis (see Figure 9). Prior to this 
era, Venezuela had been the main migrant-receiving country in South America thanks to 
its affluence and prosperity. Due to the most recent diaspora, the region experienced a wave 
of migration unlike ever before, as the countries that typically sent immigrants were now 
on the receiving end.80 Out of all nations, Colombia—historically the highest emigrant 
country in South America—became the primary destination for Venezuelan migrants. This 
was not unintentional; it was an organically forged path, grounded in historical roots. Thus, 
after half a century of mostly one-way migration, Colombia opened its borders to 
Venezuelans seeking opportunities. 
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Figure 9. Current migration numbers by waves.81  
Venezuela’s political landscape and economic downturns in the twenty-first 
century caused a reversal in a migration flow that had been established for sixty years. As 
a result, several waves of migrants have left the country, the latest of which has impacted 
Colombia. While it was initially the educated and middle-income citizens who departed, 
the most recent diaspora is characterized by poverty and desperation of the poorest 
                                                 
81 Source: “Infographic: Escape from Venezuela,” Statista, accessed April 20, 2020, 
https://www.statista.com/chart/16766/venezuela-migration/. 
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Venezuelan citizens. It is this exodus, which started in 2015, that is the focus of reception 
in this thesis.  
Colombia welcomed immigrants into an already strained economy, and its 
government pledged $228 million for health services in its border areas.82 Additionally, 
Venezuelans called the Colombian people “generous,” enabling their integration into 
society; however, beyond social amity and compassion, the Venezuelan dictatorship is seen 
by many, including Colombia, as an enemy of the people, though its citizens are not seen 
in the same light.83 The clear differentiation between the political and social structures 
makes it possible for welcoming attitudes to transcend eras, governments, economies, and 
transnational organizations. The Colombian people and the government seem to have 
recognized the maturity of the ties that had been formed over six decades because their 
response has been empathetical. The Colombian president has made statements of 
solidarity, including this one from Duque: 
It hurts us deeply to witness migrant brethren arrive into our territory with 
hunger, lacking vaccines, with chills in their bones and illnesses. They are 
victims of the dictatorship and not promoters of the dictatorship’s 
ideology.84  
Though some may see it as diplomacy, the specific language used by the president 
says a lot about the characterization of this phenomenon. What started as seasonal 
migration to Venezuela in the early to mid-nineteenth century has now formed into a deeply 
rooted identity, especially at the border, in which inhabitants see no territorial lines.85 This 
dynamic between the people of both nations has formed a metaphorical bridge that has 
withstood the test of time and the weight of the millions who have crossed it. Structurally 
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aided by government and political reforms over the years, the bridge is now being crossed 
in the opposite direction, en masse, and it has not collapsed.  
While this reception may have been initially reciprocal, the Colombians in 
Venezuela have been historically stigmatized and marginalized due to their associated 
labors. Occupying mostly the lower economic sectors, Colombian has been synonymous 
in Venezuela for poor, and opportunities across the border have been limited. Despite a 
patronizing environment, Colombians have indeed thrived and been able to reach a level 
of stability not available back home. It is also true that Venezuelans have not always wanted 
Colombians as immigrants, but evidence overwhelmingly indicates that both nations and 
their citizens have benefited from the socioeconomic dynamic that resulted from these 
interactions. Ultimately, these migrations have had a stabilizing feature in an otherwise 
chaotic environment.  
Furthermore, even though the border between Venezuela and Colombia is socially 
amalgamated, there is not a single identity or culture that dominates these migratory 
patterns. Evidence from as early as the 1970s shows that while the border states are the 
primary destinations during migrations, Colombians have settled in regions that are more 
culturally similar to their origin.86 The reinforcement of similar cultures joining together 
has strengthened the ties between both peoples and nations. Thus, borders have been 
characterized as an “artificial division” of people that were already united.87  
To summarize, multiple factors have historically strengthened ties between both 
nations at economic, political, and social levels, but it has been the border identity that has 
transcended the challenges of all eras, including the Venezuelan migration crisis. 
Beginning with an economic perspective, both Colombians and Venezuelans benefited 
from seasonal and permanent migration. Colombia’s unemployed and mostly 
underprivileged workforce was able to find opportunities abroad, and many sent 
remittances. Moreover, necessitous Colombians were replenishing Venezuela’s labor 
market in key sectors of the economy, such as oil, farming, and domestic jobs, which were 
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in high demand during a time of urbanization.88 The fulfilment of these market necessities 
by Colombians enabled Venezuelan citizens to ascend the socioeconomic ladder at a time 
when internal diasporas favored metropolitan areas. Consequently, Colombian migrants 
played a pivotal role in Venezuela by enabling it to economically capitalize on the labor 
gains. Likewise, Colombia was able to grow its localized and national economies.  
Politically, both Venezuela and Colombia have directly addressed immigration 
challenges head-on, even if at times citizens themselves may have not welcomed low-skill 
migrants. These policies were able to provide a framework from which migrants could 
benefit, though millions of illegal workers have also benefited. The positive declarations 
and demeanor with which migrants have been viewed at the state level have facilitated 
long-lasting migrations, as well as integration of refugees into Venezuelan society. The 
same trend is true today, within the current crisis. In 2018, Venezuelans in Colombia were 
given a “special stay” permit that allowed them to be legally employed.89 Furthermore, the 
Colombian government estimated the migrants would remain in the country at least three 
years, though they suspected it might be longer. The anticipation of a prolonged stay 
suggests that even if the nation was not fully prepared to handle the inflow, it at least had 
realistic expectations about the situation. 
When the Venezuelan exodus began, the initial political and social consensus 
among Latin American states and regional reports was that this downturn was going to be 
temporary. Even though the current Venezuelan sociopolitical environment indicates that 
this catastrophe is nowhere near subsiding, countries that believed stability would return 
within a few years should not be faulted. Since at least the 1950s, Venezuela has over-
depended on its oil supply for its financial growth; though it has suffered setbacks when 
prices in commodities have dropped, the country’s economy has typically rebounded 
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within a few years. Therefore, offering help to Venezuelan refugees seemed feasible under 
the assumption that conditions back home would improve within a few years and that 
migrants would then be able to return. However, five years into the crisis, repatriation is 
far from reality. Based on historical trends, it is understandable that Latin American states 
would treat this crisis as a transient economic issue rather than a lasting regional disaster.  
Considering the perception that this dilemma would be episodic upon the beginning 
of the catastrophe in 2015, most regional countries reacted promptly and acted generously 
in their efforts to assist fleeing Venezuelans. Furthermore, the majority of Latin American 
states remained consistent with the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees—an 
agreement urging each partner to contribute in assisting refugees and providing asylum—
that undoubtedly had a significant role the cordiality of the initial response. Consequently, 
the two largest migrant recipients, Colombia and Peru, opened their borders and facilitated 
documentation, eased entry requirements, provided job opportunities, and propagated a 
welcoming message across their populations. The situation was largely understood by each 
receiving nation’s citizens, and, even though there were isolated xenophobic incidents, the 
reception was largely positive at the political, social, and individual levels. 
Thus, in direct comparison to regional neighbors and despite its internal fiscal 
limitations in accommodating such a sudden and large increase of migrants, Colombia’s 
enduring warm reception defied expectations. Economically, the country has never been 
considered developed and, though there are some affluent metropolitan areas and major 
cities, there is still a significant poverty rate. Additionally, the nation has been historically 
plagued by social inequality since its creation, and elites have long governed without 
producing significant advancement to the rest of the population. The combination of these 
factors strongly indicates that Colombia is not set up to succeed through this migration 
crisis. However, in this case, the history of migration between Colombia and Venezuela 
has cemented an identity that is keen on continued support of refugees. Ultimately, the 
bonds that have existed in this region predate and transcend borders, governments, and 
economies, and have generated solidrarity amid the ongoing Venezuelan exodus.  
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III. PERU’S INITIAL ACCEPTANCE OF VENEZUELANS SHIFTS
TOWARD REJECTION 
A. INTRODUCTION
Following in the South American welcoming trend, Peru received Venezuelans
early on with a sense of solidarity, enabling 860,000 immigrants to settle in the country. 
By providing working opportunities and spreading a positive political message, Peru 
became the second highest immigrant-receiving nation amidst this crisis. Furthermore, its 
capital, Lima, currently holds the greatest concentration of Venezuelans in the world.90 
However, as the exodus entered its fourth year in 2019, Peru’s reception changed from a 
hospitable attitude to one of hostility and rejection. In this chapter, I argue that the lack of 
strong historical ties between Venezuela and Peru lowered the tolerability that Peru had 
with the new immigrants. In addition, I also argue that certain socioeconomic and political 
factors play an important role in shaping how the reception developed. 
Initially, practically all South American countries were open to receiving 
immigrants, and Peru was no exception. Staying true to the 1984 Cartagena Accord,91 the 
nation has done its part to ease a migratory crisis that shows no signs of ceasing. 
Additionally, because the majority of Venezuelan immigrants are now leaving to survive, 
the receiving countries are taking in the poorest migrants. Recognizing this, regional states 
opened their borders, and facilitated entry to the more than five-million fleeing 
Venezuelans. However, just as the welcoming trend caught on initially, so did the turn 
toward rejection, and now most regional states, including Peru, are turning vulnerable 
migrants away for multiple reasons, making it very difficult for them to enter.  
By examining Peru as the most welcoming nation that turned against receiving 
more migrants, I seek to uncover the cause for why there was a sudden and unforeseen shift 
90 José Luis Bacigalupo and Patricio M. Goldstein, “The Venezuelan Exodus in Peru: A First 
Approximation,” Latin America Policy Journal, Spring 2019. 
91 Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, “The Helping Clause of the 1984 Cartagena Declaration,” Caracas 
Chronicles (blog), July 6, 2019, https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2019/07/06/the-helping-clause-of-the-
1984-cartagena-declaration/. 
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in attitude. It is not because of a lack of necessity, since the Venezuelan exodus continues 
to wreak havoc in the region, so the need is still there for neighboring countries to maintain 
solidarity with the fleeing migrants. Therefore, it is puzzling that Peru would go from being 
accepting and accommodating, into a nation that Venezuelans are willingly choosing to 
leave. Hence, because this issue is complex, finding the reason for Peru’s shift in attitude 
should be explored from various angles. Therefore, this chapter examines historical, social, 
political, and economic factors to uncover the drivers of the shift toward rejection. 
Understanding that some elements are more important than others in shaping attitudes, 
Peru’s case may offer clarity showing which variables play a bigger role in causing changes 
in reception.  
Thus, what made Peru initially so welcoming? Could it be that historical ties were 
sufficient enough to warrant hosting the second largest number of migrants overall? Or, 
was it the fact that Peru wanted to be diplomatic and wanted to follow through on regional 
and international pacts to protect migrants? Initial evidence suggests that at least some 
cultural ties between immigrants and citizens allowed Peru to give Venezuelans a warm 
welcome. Yet then, why did Peru change its initially welcoming stance on the migrants? 
While there may be official reasons from the Peruvian government and its media why it 
was necessary to stop the migrant flow, the shift appears to be driven by social tension and 
political rhetoric against specific types of migrants: the poor ones.  
B. PERU AND VENEZUELA LACK STRONG HISTORICAL TIES 
Due to their historical development and colonial influence, Peru and Venezuela 
have the Spanish language and Roman Catholicism in common. Ethnically, these two 
nations have over sixty-percent mestizo population, though Peru has more Indian heritage 
whereas Venezuela maintains a larger European-based demographic. Despite some of these 
cultural similarities, Peru and Venezuela have not interacted much as either states or a 
people throughout their history. Indeed, the hardships Peru had to endure made it largely 
an emigrating country, while Venezuela experienced prosperity due to its oil supply, 
resulting in increased immigration during the same time periods.  
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Thus, following World War II, Peru experienced turbulent politics due to its ethnic 
divisions. The country also saw its share of political turmoil related to corruption and 
communist movements, such as the notorious and brutal Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), 
especially during the 1980s and 1990s, making those decades very difficult for Peru’s 
growth (see Figure 10). This violent period caused a steady outflow of citizens, and one of 
their destinations was Venezuela, which by 2005 had received 150,000 Peruvians.92 Still, 
even though Peru struggled socially and economically throughout much of the second half 
of the twentieth century, there was never a mass exodus that could cement the relationship 
between these two nations. 
Peru has experienced a significant amount of internal migration, with 6.5 million 
inhabitants moving domestically by 2010.93 These relocating citizens moved mostly 
toward city centers, and as of 2017, the ratio of urban to rural population was approximately 
eighty-percent to twenty-percent.94 This internal migration toward urban areas is a 
phenomenon Venezuela also experienced slightly after Peru. This urbanization, while 
common throughout the world, seems to be the reason that Lima, Peru has attracted over 
600,000 Venezuelans in this migration, the greatest number out of all capitals.95 Besides 
these general patterns, there are not many linkages historically uniting both nations, nor 
were there significant and lasting opportunities for them to cement solidarity with each 
other. 
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Figure 10. GNP growth throughout three decades.96 
Out of all the countries that Peruvians emigrated to until 2006, Venezuela was the 
second most-favored destination in South America, with 6.1 percent of Peru’s total 
migrants (see Figure 11). This data shows that suggests that while this migratory pattern is 
not particularly large, its occurrence may still be a factor in Peru’s reception attitudes 
toward Venezuelans. It is also notable that even though Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and 
Brazil are geographically closer to Peru, Venezuela has been favored as a destination. 
However, this migratory pattern could be explained by the affluence of the Venezuelan 
state throughout the latter part of the twentieth century, especially because it held lucrative 
job opportunities for migrants.97  
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Figure 11. Main destinations for Peruvians as of 2006.98 
Ultimately, Venezuela and Peru have historically endured similar hardships until 
about the 1950s due to regional events, but they have lacked significant interactions with 
each other as states or as a people. Outside of continental and multilateral accords that have 
also involved other neighboring countries, there have not been significant events between 
Venezuela and Peru to allow solidarity to develop. Additionally, Peru was not a major 
receiver of migrants in the period just prior to the 2015 exodus (see Figure 12). This 
dynamic has led to a relatively weak migratory relationship between Peru and Venezuela. 
Still, beginning in 2015, Peruvians greeted Venezuelans with a welcoming attitude until 
2019. Thus, while historical relations do not seem to explain Peru’s reception of refugees, 
other factors contributed to the warm welcome. 
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Figure 12. Average number of yearly refugees per country from 2006–2010, 
prior to Venezuelan crisis.99 
C. WHY WAS PERU INITIALLY WELCOMING? 
1. Peru’s Historical Experience with Other Migrants 
As shown, Peruvians and Venezuelans did not migrate to each other’s countries in 
large numbers. Peru did receive a large wave of Asian migration during the nineteenth 
century. In fact, in 1876, Chinese immigrants made up ten percent of Lima’s urban 
population.100 Even though they were brought over to fill a labor gap created by the 
abolishment of slavery, the struggle of integrating the Chinese workers into the local 
culture enabled Peru to gain experience dealing with migrants. In addition, Japanese 
laborers soon joined the work in Peruvian plantations, adding to the amalgamation of 
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cultures.101 These immigrants were joining the European settlers and indigenous 
inhabitants living in the country. 
Even though the new wave of Japanese migrants gave Peru an economic boost, 
there was a lot of racial tension because the citizens of European descent viewed many 
other races as inferior.102 Still, Japanese workers thrived even in the face of adversity, and 
they went on to start small businesses, becoming part of a foreign minority middle-class in 
the 1930s.103 Their success brought on the animosity of locals, who imposed 
discriminatory measures as a way of equalizing job opportunities. Throughout much of the 
twentieth century, Asian minorities were seen as outsiders, even leading to racial riots in 
1940. Despite so much adversity, Asian culture became engrained in Peruvian life. 
By the 1990s, Japanese-Peruvians felt more included following the election of the 
ethnically Japanese President Fujimori, but their experiences as foreigners encouraged 
them to become a tightly knit and somewhat exclusive community. As of 2010, Peru had 
approximately 600,000 Asian born or Asian-descendant people, or between one- to three-
percent.104 While the process has not been smooth, the nation has had over one-hundred 
years of experience with integrating migrants, which could be seen as a slow but successful 
feat and one that should be considered in understanding Peru’s handling of the Venezuelan 
diaspora.  
Ultimately, Peru’s integration of people from far-east countries, such as China and 
Japan, gave it an advantage in handling the current immigration crisis, as it was able to 
witness the development of foreigners within its society for an extended period of time. 
The influence of Asians in Peru is significant, and, though it has been many years since 
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this integration began, the visual and cultural diversity is still easily recognizable. The 
challenges brought about by these very distinct cultural clashes between locals and 
foreigners in Peru suggest that the country looked at its own history when it initially 
welcomed Venezuelans in 2015. While not the sole explanation for initially welcoming 
attitudes within the current crisis, Peru’s previous experience with Asian immigration was 
a contributing factor. 
2. Peru’s Observed International Accords and Implemented Policies 
Although these historical—and often chaotic—amalgamations of Asians in Peru 
helped generate an initially welcoming reaction in the current Venezuelan crisis, they also 
acted as a warning to how current migrants would be treated by local society. The lack of 
historical ties with Venezuela suggests that Peru’s political intervention and 
implementation of immigration policies played a large role in a favorable migrant 
reception. As a result of the accelerated integration of immigrants from 2015 to 2019, Peru 
required political influence to enable a welcoming reception. Although the country had 
over a century to integrate more than half a million Asians, it received 860,000 Venezuelan 
migrants in just four years.105 While this is not the first time the state deals with 
newcomers, the current Venezuelan exodus has been particularly overwhelming because 
of the rapid onset of arrivals, which placed a heavy strain on local resources in a very short 
period of time. Peru’s Venezuelan population grew from approximately 7,000 before the 
migration to 700,000 by early 2018.106 Despite the lagging economy, Peruvians were 
initially generous in their reception of migrants. The unfavorable socioeconomic 
environment was alleviated through political messages, Peru’s observation of international 
immigration accords, and the policies it put in place to aid the arriving migrants. 
With the exception of Venezuela and Argentina, all other South American countries 
had been largely migrant-sending countries without immigration experience, including 
Peru. As a result of Venezuela’s economic collapse, regional countries were placed in the 
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international spotlight, as they sought to alleviate the effects of the migration by offering 
very welcoming receptions. Peru’s desire to observe the 1951 Refugee Convention, the 
Cartagena Declaration of 1984, and other regional agreements encouraged it to be a 
hospitable host in its first wave of immigration. Therefore, the nation stepped up and not 
only did it receive the second-most Venezuelan migrants, it received the most asylum 
requests, increasing from 33,100 in 2017, to 190,500 in 2018.107 By working with the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR,)108 Peru was one of the 
nations facilitating safety, resources, shelter, and maintaining solidarity with the migrants 
by fighting xenophobia.  
As a sign of its pledge to the refugees, the Peruvian government implemented four 
measures to ease the Venezuelan integration. First, it granted Temporary Permanence 
Permits (PTP) in early 2017, enabling Venezuelans to work and reside legally in the 
country for one year.109 In addition, it also implemented the resident worker visa, a 
foreigner identification card, and a humanitarian visa.110 Furthermore, Peru’s relaxed 
informal sector allowed more opportunities and a less-stringent labor market for migrants 
than that of Colombia’s. The implemented policies and tangible acceptance of almost a 
million refugees classified Peru as one of the most welcoming in Latin America. 
Even though it has historically been an emigrating country, Peru played a major 
part in alleviating the impact of the Venezuelan crisis by granting residency and processing 
the highest number of asylum-claims in South America (see Figure 13). This large number 
was driven not by chance, but because the favorable policies implemented by the Peruvian 
government. Thus, several waves of Venezuelans have chosen Peru as their destination 
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even though other options are situated geographically closer. Ultimately, the adherence to 
international regulations and innovative local measures made Peru one of the most 
welcoming nations, and host to the second largest number of Venezuelans in South 
America (see Figure 14).  
 
Figure 13. Forms of documentation held by Venezuelans per country.111 
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Data current as of 5 August 2020. Author’s representation of data from the 
IOM.112 
Figure 14. Venezuelan-receiving nations and figures.113  
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Ultimately, Peru’s welcoming demeanor seemed to indicate that the country would 
always be a safe refuge for migrants. The state’s dedication to international accords and 
regional agreements were effective, as was the Peruvian government in encouraging 
solidarity with Venezuelans. However, the tide turned. Peru’s swing toward migrant 
rejection was abrupt, and the country’s patience with migrants expired. Thus, even though 
there is an aura of hostility toward immigrants, this research is, by no means, meant to 
characterize the receptive country’s population with a broad brush in a negative manner 
but it does seek to identify the root cause of receptive attitudes. As a result, there may be 
negative connotations related to how the migrants have been treated.  
D. WHY DID PERU MAKE A 180-DEGREE TURN IN ITS ACCEPTANCE 
OF VENEZUELANS? 
1. Understanding the Three Waves of Venezuelan Migrants 
The large number of migrants arrived in the form of three distinct waves of 
Venezuelans. In 2000, the first wave was made up of a wealthier base who disagreed 
politically with the regime of the time, and these migrants were able to choose their 
destinations without many obstacles. However, the 2015 crisis is made up of both, the 
second wave, which ended in about 2017–2018, and the third wave, which is still 
ongoing.114 During the second wave, Peru was experiencing economic growth, and ninety-
percent of Venezuelans between the ages of 25 to 45 arriving in the country were motivated 
by working opportunities because most of them were highly qualified.115 Among these 
migrants, many were engineers, professional sports players, oil experts, and medical 
workers.116 Therefore, one of the major reasons Peru was a top migrant destination was 
job opportunities. With such a high degree of expertise, this wave of migrants was highly 
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desirable to Peru. Thus, the available labor opportunities, coupled with the types of 
migrants arriving during this time, created a favorable environment for immigrants in Peru. 
2. The Third Wave: The Undesirable Walkers
Despite the job opportunities for the middle- and upper-class Venezuelans, the third 
wave drastically changed reception attitudes. Arriving around 2017 and later, this group 
was mostly made up of the desperate migrants seeking survival. Peru’s reception of middle-
class workers provided hope for third-wave migrants, spurring even more migration. In 
2018 alone, approximately 500,000 Venezuelans arrived in Peru.117 This group of 
migrants held the most vulnerable persons—children, women, disabled, and the elderly—
many who sought safety from raging violence or needed medical care and basic resources 
not available back in Venezuela. These travelers are so poor, they cannot afford any other 
way to relocate but by walking; thus, in Spanish, they are known as the “Venezuelan 
walkers.”118 
At times, people from this wave of migrants had family members or friends who 
had found some success, motivating this vulnerable group to join them. However, the 
reception was not the same for the newest arrivals. In a group of interviewed migrants from 
the third wave, a Venezuelan whose brothers had made it to Peru was arrested upon arrival 
in 2019, and deported back almost immediately.119 This trend is all too common as of late 
as more migrants have found it difficult to enter Peru. Although it is clear that Venezuelan 
migrants initially chose Peru as one of their main destinations, the reception for these types 
of migrants vastly changed from how previous arrivals were treated. 
Thus, after a favorable reception, evidence suggests that Peru turned away from the 
Venezuelan crisis and its people, after the arrival of the third wave. As the poor migrants 
117 Brian Winter, “The Backlash to Venezuelan Migration Is Here,” Americas Quarterly (blog), April 
20, 2020, https://live-aqimportwithimages.pantheonsite.io/article/the-backlash-to-venezuelan-migration-is-
here/. 
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September 5, 2019, YouTube, video, 25:53, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?time_continue=592&v=XZhw7nnErNw&feature=emb_logo. 
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crossed the border in greater numbers, fear and xenophobic occurrences went from being 
isolated incidents to almost being expected in daily life. This type of reception was not 
evident during the first two waves, when upper- and middle-class migrants arrived until 
early 2018. However, by 2019, the reception attitudes started to change and a poll 
conducted within Peru shows the deterioration of attitude toward Venezuelans (see Figure 
15). The Peruvian responses indicated that there was a significant shift in those two years, 
even though the crisis had been going on for nearly four years. Therefore, the media likely 
played a large part in shifting attitudes because it spread anti-immigrant messages on-air 
while many politicians took the stage to promulgate an anti-Venezuelan approach.120 The 
combination of these factors changed Peru’s stance from one of the most welcoming 
nations to a considerably hostile environment. This assessment is not all-encompassing but 
it does capture the effect of sociopolitical influences on reception attitudes.  
120 “Ricardo Belmont: ‘Los venezolanos están casi como dueños de casa,’ [The Venezuelans act like 




Figure 15. Poll showing increase in xenophobic sentiment toward 
Venezuelans 2018–2019.121 
Beginning with Peru’s political rhetoric, Venezuelans were being blamed for 
crimes, even though official statistics refuted such claims.122 Moreover, Peru’s media has, 
at times, participated in spreading out certain fears about the migrants’ role in reducing job 
opportunities for Peruvian citizens. These fears are rooted in the fact that, according to 
Venezuela’s ambassador in Peru, ninety-percent of Venezuelans are performing jobs 
without any formal contracts.123 This economic landscape is of significant concern 
because seventy percent of Peruvian workers are employed in the informal sector, so they 
see Venezuelans as competition.124 In spite of the lingering fears, claims about stealing 
jobs have been studied in detail in many cases throughout the world, and they have been 
proven to be baseless theoretically and empirically, though they have still affected native’s 
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reactions. Hence, politicians and the media played at least a partial role in shortening Peru’s 
period of solidarity with the Venezuelan immigrants. 
One of the measures Peru implemented in June 2019 was a requirement for 
Venezuelans to provide a humanitarian visa to gain entry.125 While in theory this visa 
would grant essential rights to the holder, this requirement made it extremely difficult for 
the remaining migrants to come into Peru because they have no way of acquiring such 
documents. As a result, net migration fell to zero by the middle of 2019.126 Moreover, this 
tactic produced a domino effect in the neighboring countries, with Ecuador establishing 
similar measures soon after.127 The situation is aggravated by the unceasing economic 
downturn that continues to drive people out of Venezuela, people who were once well off 
at home but are now confined to begging on the streets. These implementations by the 
Peruvian government have not only failed to work, they have exacerbated the situation and 
forced desperate individuals to seek desperate measures. Thus, violence has risen both, in 
Venezuela, as well as in Peru. Consequently, citizens have reinforced their negative views 
of the refugees, though evidence shows that crime caused by Venezuelan immigrants in 
Peru is extremely low when compared to the natives.  
Although Peru did grant arriving Venezuelans permits to work and live in the 
country, they were largely inadequate given the severity of this crisis. These temporary 
rights provided only limited documents that provided a short-term solution. The problem 
seems to stem from a misinformation of rights being promulgated to the refugees, who do 
not fully know what avenues they are able to legally pursue. One such legislation that goes 
hidden is from 2003, and provides a more lasting solution for those seeking a permanent 
home.128 However, because most migrants take advantage of the temporary benefits, they 
are left as stateless and illegal aliens upon expiration of the permits. Without a follow-on 
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recourse, the Peruvian government finds it suitable to deport those who have overextended 
their stay, while anti-refugee riots fuel a hostile sentiment toward Venezuelans.129 
These recent feelings of animosity have presented themselves through interviews. 
In a poll conducted in the capital of Lima in 2019, seventy-eight percent of Venezuelans 
reported feeling that they perceived Peruvians felt that their culture and lifestyle was highly 
threatened by Venezuelan immigration.130 Additionally, eighty-percent of the migrants 
reported that they had received threats and insults by Peruvians just because of their 
country of origin.131 These statistics are alarming, and show a trend of gradually 
deteriorating attitudes. The situation may not be a matter of hate, but it shows signs that 
the bonhomie has indeed expired. 
Ultimately, multiple factors made Peru shift from being a welcoming nation, to 
closing borders and deporting immigrants. For one, their temporary permits provided only 
a limited solution. Furthermore, some of the media and politicians seemed to work hand in 
hand in promulgating messages of fear and xenophobia. Moreover, the third wave of 
migrants has proven to be too much for Peru to handle at a social level. These factors are 
not helped by the fact that Peru and Venezuela have weak historical ties. It will likely take 
an extreme legislative and social overhaul for Peru to maintain open borders. Until then, 
Venezuelans are stuck in Colombia or must endure the journeys that lead them south of 
Peru. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. THE PUZZLE OF IMMIGRANT RECEPTION ATTITUDES 
Throughout history, mass migrations have changed the landscape in the sending 
and receiving states. As migrants have relocated, reception attitudes in the receiving 
countries have greatly varied and even evolved over the course of the migration. Thus, the 
reception of migrants by receiving nations has ranged from welcoming to hostile. Due to 
the complexity of diasporas, identifying the cause of attitude variations has been an elusive 
task because various factors can influence native reception attitudes. This dilemma has 
presented a puzzle for all parties involved and has exacerbated the challenges inherent to 
mass migrations. 
To research this puzzle, this thesis observed the ongoing case of the Venezuelan 
mass migration. As a result of severe economic mismanagement and corruption, the 
Venezuelan migration crisis started in 2015, and thus far, 5.1 million people have fled. The 
two most welcoming countries based on acceptance numbers, policies, and empathy, have 
been Colombia and Peru. However, in 2019—four years into the crisis—Peru completely 
turned from their initial stance, while Colombia maintained solidarity with the Venezuelan 
migrants. The stark difference in how the receiving nations’ paths diverged four years into 
the crisis provided the perfect situation to research the variation in migrant reception 
attitudes. 
B. HISTORICAL INTERACTIONS MATTER 
Previously, scholars had viewed migrant reception attitudes in contexts that 
captured a limited snapshot of time. Although their research methods found certain 
variables that do affect attitudes, such as the fear of losing a job or the fear of increased 
violence, they lacked an in-depth analysis of the relationship between the sending and 
receiving nations and how that dynamic has influenced attitude variation. Consequently, 
the present study observed relevant historical interactions that Colombia and Peru had with 
Venezuela to understand if these connections—or lack thereof—affected how migrants 
were viewed in the receiving nation. Along with examining common migratory events 
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between the sending and receiving countries, this thesis analyzed the pertinent social, 
economic, and political factors. 
One of the reasons historical ties have been ignored is because when looking for 
answers to attitude variation, current events have taken precedence in research, as they can 
appear more compelling. Consequently, historical facts can be deemed irrelevant, while 
salient topics drive the discussion. Moreover, since mass migrations are driven by specific 
catastrophic events, studies tend to focus around the situational context, which seems like 
a natural course of action. In other words, in searching for variation in reception attitudes, 
scholars have looked to answer puzzles happening in the present with evidence also found 
in the present, such as current labor conditions, polls indicating natives’ sentiment, and 
media and political responses. However, this approach limits the scope of possible 
solutions because it leaves out a very important point and one that often is overlooked or 
underplayed when researching migrant reception attitudes: historical interactions matter. 
Just as relationships between people or between nations are affected by historical events, 
reception attitudes are also influenced by how—and if—two nations or their citizens have 
previously interacted with each other, and the legacies of those interactions.  
With the understanding that historical relationships and milestones do play a role 
in how migratory receptions develop, the extent to which the historical variables impact 
attitudes largely depend on the strength of past social ties compared to the weight of the 
current social, economic, and political factors in the receiving country. Therefore, if 
historical ties are strong, it will be harder for the other three factors to influence the 
sentiment that has already been established. Conversely, if historical ties are weak or 
nonexistent, present factors will have a greater influence on the mood of the reception 
attitudes.  
In Colombia’s case, the evidence suggests that historical ties proved significant in 
establishing bonhomie, while other factors reinforced solidarity with Venezuelan migrants. 
In Peru, historical ties were weak, but present-day factors were sufficient to establish short-
term solidarity. The divergence arrived four years into the crisis, and at that point, the 
present-day variables were insufficient for Peru to continue receiving migrants, while in 
Colombia, the reception’s demeanor remains largely unchanged from initial hospitality. 
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C. COLOMBIA’S RESPONSE 
From the beginning of Venezuela’s migration crisis, Colombia actively supported 
the immigrants socially, politically, and to an extent, economically. Having taken in 1.5 
million migrants to date, Colombia became the top destination for Venezuelan refugees. 
While geographic proximity certainly factors into where Venezuelans go, earlier migrants 
had more means, meaning more options to travel farther, but still chose Colombia. 
Moreover, the favorable perspective in which Venezuelans are viewed in Colombia ensures 
continued solidarity.  
One of the most prominent voices for Colombia’s welcoming reception has been 
the country’s president, Ivan Duque, who referred to all incoming migrants as 
“brothers.”132 His outspoken support of Venezuelans reflected the strength of social ties 
and reinforced the willingness of Colombian citizens to act with empathy. Despite the 
alleviating effect of positive rhetoric, it is not just kind words and social acts that fueled 
this warm reception; the historical migratory patterns between Venezuela and Colombia 
gave way to bilateral accords after both nations realized the importance of the interactions 
at their shared border. What followed was a recognition of each other’s citizens and 
working opportunities for migrants, actions that have, in turn, generated a continued sense 
of solidarity regardless of the dilemmas occurring within either country. Not only that, but 
because of its troubled past, Colombia has extensive experience with internally displaced 
persons, which may have contributed to the experience of relocating the Venezuelan 
migrants (see Figure 16). 
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Figure 16. Top twenty countries with the greatest number of internally 
displaced persons at the end of 2011.133 
Beginning in the 1970s, Venezuela was generally a wealthy oil nation while 
neighboring countries struggled. As a result, numerous Colombians migrated back and 
forth into Venezuela as periodic crises created significant displacements. Hence, the 
relationship between both nation’s peoples has persevered through some of the greatest 
national challenges, such as drug wars, economic recessions and depressions, extreme 
violence, and political hostilities. Therefore, while in a mass-migration it could reasonably 
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be expected that the immigrants would be seen as outsiders, that has not been the case in 
Colombia’s reception. Ultimately, the social, political, and economic factors worked in 
tandem with the strong historical ties to form a migrant-friendly environment that has 
proven more durable than any individual factor. 
Thus, in Colombia’s acceptance of Venezuelan migrants, solidarity has withstood 
the test of contextual national challenges, such as the lack of infrastructure, low economic 
resources, and animosity between governments. These factors, although important, have 
not threatened to flip the initially welcoming response. A prominent poll showed that 
Colombians welcome increased diversity, which is good news for immigrants who choose 
it as a destination (see Figure 17). What is not clear is if Venezuelans are considered diverse 
from Colombians, as that would be more a question of identity.  
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Figure 17. Sixty-six percent of Colombians believe diversity would make the 
country better.134 
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Regardless, other factors seem to have less weight on changing migrant reception 
attitudes than historical ties. Despite being considered a developing country in many 
respects, Colombia has welcomed Venezuelans and reciprocity has enabled increased 
hospitality. Venezuela had received millions of Colombian migrants throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century, and although they were employed mostly in the lower tiers 
of the economy, it offered migratory workers a chance to succeed abroad. This previous 
dynamic has not been forgotten, and Colombian leaders have acknowledged their 
gratefulness to the Venezuelans for having received migrants for so many years. 
For instance, if the crisis were observed strictly since it started in 2015 until 2019, 
determining factors for migratory reception attitudes would be difficult, if not impossible 
to solve. Hence, the evidence suggests that within the last fifty years, the amalgamation of 
cultures and societies at the Colombia-Venezuela border have softened the blow of the 
crisis and enabled prolonged solidarity. While favorable historical ties do have the capacity 
to alleviate the severity of a crisis between two nations, it does not mean that ties are the 
only variable in determining attitudes, or that harmonious effects will be permanent. Still, 
acknowledging the influential capacity of past linkages on present-day migrant-reception 
attitudes is the foundation of this study. It provided a clearer understanding of why migrants 
chose certain countries and how they were treated once they arrive. 
D. PERU’S RESPONSE 
Conversely, although Peru offered Venezuelans an even more welcoming reception 
at the start of the exodus than Colombia, its openness to receiving migrants expired first. 
From 2015–2017—the first two years of the migration crisis—Peru was quick to offer 
support, and provided some of the most generous benefits to Venezuelans, allowing them 
to work for at least a year. Consequently, Peru quickly became the country with the second 
largest number of Venezuelans migrants in the world. This cycle continued, and political, 
social, and economic factors appeared to provide favorable environment for the arriving 
refugees. However, as people continued to pour in, by 2019, Peru decided to close its 
borders.  
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Considering the lack of past interactions between Peru and Venezuela, there is not 
much evidence to attribute a welcoming response to the historical variable. Therefore, other 
factors enabled an initially welcoming response. A century since Asian migration began, 
Peru was faced with a new cultural integration problem. As a result of the tensions 
experienced in its previous immigration dilemma, the country was eager to follow regional 
and international accords. After all, the Venezuelan exodus was larger and quicker than 
any migration Peru had ever experienced, and its track record with the Asian integration 
had been a long and painful process. Still, having this experience, along with the fact that 
its economy was growing when the crisis started in 2015, meant that Peru could benefit 
from the first wave of arrivals. The first and second waves came to work, and although 
informal labor is a large part of the Peruvian economy, the country saw that it could benefit 
from young, motivated, and qualified workers. The mutual advantages between Peru and 
the Venezuelan migrants made the country the second most chosen destination in this 
migration crisis. 
As the pool of working migrants dried up by 2018, the third wave did not come 
seeking work; they came seeking survival. Originating from very low-income areas, the 
last group was composed of persons who were more vulnerable in times of crises, such as 
women, teens, children, the ill, and the elderly. With its policies unchanged when this wave 
began, Peru received these poorer migrants beginning in 2018. Xenophobic events were on 
the rise and the national sentiment soured, followed by closing the border and legal 
restrictions for entry of Venezuelans in 2019. Without a clear explanation for the change 
of heart, the new variable that aligned with the timing of the response shift is the profile of 
the migrants who entered, the poor ones. 
Acknowledging that Peru has had persistent political turmoil during the Venezuelan 
migration crisis, there was no indication, based on this research, that these internal 
struggles affected attitudes. On the other hand, the theory for why Peru departed from its 
initial response is reinforced by evidence from cases in the United States and Europe that 
show that immigrants with low education and low skill are more likely to receive backlash, 
69 
while highly educated ones diminish nationalism.135 Thus, the lack of meaningful 
historical ties between Peru and Venezuela enabled a nationalistic response to manifest 
unchecked.  
E. THEORETICAL TAKEAWAYS 
In light of the evidence found to affect reception attitudes toward Venezuelan 
migrants in Colombia and Peru, theoretical lessons can be drawn. These cases have 
reinforced how complex and organic migratory movements are. As such, one must be 
weary of monocausal explanations or approaches that oversimplify the relationship 
between the relevant factors affecting attitudes toward migrants.  
The first central finding is that historical interactions are important when studying 
current attitudes toward immigrants. Although the tendency in studying reception attitudes 
is to focus on present-day contextual factors, studying historical interactions can reveal ties 
that would otherwise go unnoticed and shed light on otherwise puzzling variation in these 
attitudes. At the individual level, citizens have memories of past events, which affect their 
present behavior in reception attitudes, yielding sentiments of reciprocity, as well as 
animosity. Therefore, by considering previous experiences, one lays the foundation for the 
research and a solid starting point for understanding the factors that currently have the 
greatest influence on reception attitudes. 
Second, despite the importance that historical ties have on migrant-acceptance 
behavior, there is a balance between past interactions and other salient events affecting the 
migratory landscape. Determining which past events have significant influence in a present 
crisis requires a historical observation of events that are not only pertinent, but that are still 
recalled by the current national memory. This is to say that Colombia, as a whole, still 
remembers Venezuela’s acceptance of migrants, leading to a sense of reciprocity. 
Conversely, even though Peru has fully integrated Asians into its society, too much time 
has passed between that period and the present for it to be a major factor in its current 
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reception attitudes. Consequently, with the lack of reinforcement of ties through periodic 
migrations, Peru has nothing to turn to in the past as a means to encourage steady solidarity 
in the Venezuelan crisis.  
Third, historical ties provide crucial contextualization. With other salient elements 
that influence natives’ behaviors in a current crisis, historical connections provide an 
anchor depending on the strength of the ties between the migrant sending and receiving 
nations. In other words, a friendship between two nations is more likely to endure 
catastrophic change for a longer period than two states that share few or no ties. In those 
countries that lack historical interactions, the social response will most likely be swayed 
by institutional, economic, and political factors. Yet, in countries where ties are strong, the 
effects of current-day factors may be significantly placated.  
In Peru’s case, it is clear that there is an absence of meaningful historical ties with 
Venezuela. As a result, other factors exert greater influence over migrant reception 
attitudes, such as legal frameworks, international accords, funding, and rhetoric by national 
leaders, to name a few. These factors are consequential; looking to comply with signed 
accords and international norms, Peru welcomed a large number of Venezuelan immigrants 
and adopted numerous social policies to enable their successful incorporation and 
adaptation to Peruvian society. For the first four years of the migration crisis, Peru received 
Venezuelan immigrants with open arms. Yet, the absence of historical ties seems to have 
made Peru less willing to sustain its compliance with the established norms once economic 
and political conditions started to shift. Ultimately, Peru opted to close its borders to further 
Venezuelan migration. This shift, moreover, seems to have been a response to changing 
trends in the influx of Venezuelans; as the crisis extended, the composition of those 
immigrant populations shifted from middle classes to the poor and vulnerable, and with 
this shift, Peru’s backlash began. The reaction to the arrival of poor migrants highlighted 
the class dynamics in Peru and exacerbated the crisis. In Colombia, on the other hand, 
historical ties have, thus far, been able to fend off negativity toward poor migrants.  
Lastly, it is important to note that the size of a migration and the time span in which 
it occurs are very influential in testing a nation’s reception attitudes. The Venezuelan crisis 
occurred relatively quickly and with a mass outflow that initially overwhelmed regional 
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neighbors. Thus, relying on initial friendliness and empathy is only a temporary solution. 
After that, it is up to the state to be able to provide livable conditions for citizens and 
immigrants alike; otherwise, the population will turn on its government, since locals and 
foreigners in developing countries do not wield any power.  
F. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The Venezuelan migration crisis has devastated South America in a catastrophic 
manner because it is extremely underfunded and understudied, leaving countries to fend 
for themselves.136 Although many nations have been creative about their solutions, others 
have not been so open, and the migration numbers tell part of that story. Hence, there is a 
disparity between the capacity for South American countries to host migrants and the actual 
contribution they have made toward alleviating the crisis. For instance, although it is the 
largest nation in South America, Brazil has taken in very few migrants while Colombia and 
Peru have borne the greatest burden of this crisis. As this research showed, one of the 
indicators for how a nation will react toward migrants is based on the historical linkages 
between the sending and receiving populations.  
The findings in this thesis can aid policymakers in determining how the United 
States should allocate funding and resources by strongly considering historical ties. Using 
this research as a basis for qualification in allocation of funding, the United States can 
anticipate which nations will be the largest recipients of migrants and which ones are most 
likely to have a lasting, welcoming acceptance. Lastly, by focusing efforts and funding on 
the recipient nations that have the strongest historical linkages to the migrant-sending 
nation, the United States would not only reinforce those relations and encourage 
welcoming attitudes, it would also facilitate regional stability, thereby protecting its own 
interests.  
Another way the United States can apply this approach is by raising awareness of 
the differences between receiving nations and their relationship to the immigrant 
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population. All other factors being equal, there is a difference in which regional nation is 
willing to help during a neighborly crisis. As this research suggests, economic affluence is 
not an indicator of which nation will provide the greatest assistance to desperate 
neighboring migrants. As such, the United States should focus on increasing aid where 
established friendly relations exist between the sending and receiving populations, as it can 
expected that the bonhomie would be longer lasting than in the case of two nations without 
strong historical ties. In light of these findings, this approach to policy would be more 
efficient by directing efforts where they are most likely to last. 
Finally, expectations for migration crises should be to seek permanent relocation 
solutions to enable a welcoming and integrating mentality as opposed to temporary 
hospitality. This permanent solution better prepares the receiving nations, because the 
causes of forced migrations often create irreversible damages in the sending nation, such 
as wars, violence, and even climate catastrophes. Ensuring the receiving nation and its 
people are mentally and psychologically prepared for the arrival of a large number of 
newcomers would alleviate preconceived notions about immigrants, and might help spur 
early solutions within the economy, the government, and social institutions. One of the 
ways to ensure that citizens are ready for a sudden change is through education. With social 
programs and institutional backing, the reception of migrants can be normalized. However, 
because the consequences and timelines of national crises are very difficult to predict, the 
focus should be on permanent solutions rather than stopgap measures. Ultimately, by 
treating immigrants of national crises as permanent residents and providing basic 
resources, they can contribute to the local economy and social dynamic as a citizen would.  
G. FUTURE RESEARCH 
Forced mass migrations are complex organic movements and the Venezuelan case 
is no exception. As the exodus continues into its fifth year, different nations are beginning 
to gain more migrants, such as Chile and Argentina, while Peru has begun losing some. 
Although this study captured migration numbers, it did not capture the sentiment of the 
migrants themselves or their basis for selection of a country. Understanding Venezuelan 
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migrants and their desires may reveal if the different waves had their own preconceived 
notions about what each receiving nation would be like.  
At the state level, it would be useful to know how the nations that have received 
the migrants have benefited or been hurt by the continued migration. Furthermore, knowing 
if receiving countries are internally or externally motivated to receive migrants would 
provide answers to how regional states could be incentivized to participate. Due to the 
severity of the Venezuelan migration crisis, it seemed like the receiving countries initially 
had no option but to take the migrants. However, when Peru and Ecuador closed their 
borders and reduced immigration to near zero, it became clear that they did have a choice. 
The problem is that all countries in the region should, by this point, be motivated to bring 
in migrants because with every Venezuelan they allow through their borders, they are 
saving at least one life.  
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